**Capitalism/Kroker**

**Baudrillard/Kroker/Etc**

**War no longer operates in terms of interstate conflicts but instead exists at the level of accumulation – careless conflict constantly reproduces itself to sustain the accumulation of excess to be operationalized in the nation state’s global war on difference**

**Meiches ’13 –** Benjamin, Department of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins University, (“The Responsibility to Protect and luxurious war”, pp.224-227, http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcss20) – sel

Luxurious war

Together, these transformations constitute what I describe **‘luxurious war**,’ or a mode of war driven by the **accumulation of excess** and the invention of new outlets of **expenditure**. In my view, luxurious war serves as a diagram for describing numerous developments in warfare including a set of ‘**virtual’** dimensions of global war. In general, luxurious war exhibits three dynamics: (1) the dissemination of expenditure into new **conflicts**, **technologies**, and **military-economic** processes; (2) a **libidinal investment** in war as a mode of political reproduction; and (3) the tendency towards unruly outbursts of war in the form of ‘**careless’** expenditure. A number of these dynamics have been described in the emerging literature on critical war studies. The work of Michael Dillon and Julian Reid (2000) and Miguel de Larrinaga and Mark Doucet (2008), for instance, link Michel Foucault’s (2003) and Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) discussions of the biopolitical to the tendency of contemporary wars, to expose populations to death. In these accounts, war increasingly deploys indiscriminate violence in order to preserve, normalize, and regulate political life. Similarly, Vivienne Jabri’s (2006) work on the transformation of war, Mark Duffield’s (2002) description of networked war, and Leerom Medevoi’s (2007) exploration of the expansion of military projects into civilian affairs all capture the tendency of war to **infiltrate** traditional democratic structures and convert them into vehicles for the expansion of **political power**. These accounts describe the implications of the slow diffusion of war into new practices, technologies, and political structures. In addition, scholars such as Brad Evans and Michael Hardt (2010) excavate the imbrications of contemporary war and liberal capitalism and touch upon the connection between processes of accumulation and the dissemination of new forms of war. In their view, following Gilles Deleuze, war no longer takes place as **interstate war**, but as a form of continual **civil war** fostered and reproduced by the **economic** and **political** dynamics of **liberalism**. Bataille’s development of luxurious war provides a parallel explanation for the emergence of many of these dynamics in contemporary war. However, it makes two distinctive contributions to the literature on contemporary war. First, luxurious war focuses on the **material** and **libidinal** dimensions of excess. Many critical accounts of warfare, in contrast, discuss the rise of new practices of war in the context of political governance, organizing rubrics, or schemas of understanding. For Bataille, the concepts of organizing governance are important but secondary to the material ‘curse’ of excess. In other words, while new forms of governmentality might reconceptualize the terrain of war, this reconceptualization is produced from within the dynamics of the **solar economy**. In this way, Bataille provides a bridge between changes in the material context of war and technologies of governance. Second, luxurious war treats **ontological** or **topological** shifts in war as responses to the contingent arrangement of excess. Although many developments in critical war studies problematize these shifts, they subordinate the unpredictable dimensions of war to political categories or divisions. In contrast, Bataille views these shifts as a messy creative process intrinsic to the search for **new modes of expenditure** in war. In short, luxurious war shows the wild becomings in warfare, which often **surpass** technologies of political governance. Several trends in contemporary warfare help to illustrate these points: the diffusion of military and war-fighting capacity across the globe, the rise of ‘**riskless’** war, and the development of ‘**precision’** war. Each of these developments correspond to the features of luxurious war: the accumulation of **excess** and creation of new modes of **expenditure**; investment in war as a form of **political reproduction**; and the tendency for **‘careless’ expenditure**. According to many critical accounts of war, these developments arise in an effort to violently secure life by discarding ‘**undesirable’** segments of the population. For Bataille, the constructs organizing sacrifice in political life remain secondary to the virulent movements of excess and the demands of expenditure. In this sense, while a ‘biopolitical’ description of war explains how political divisions expose certain populations to death, luxurious war elaborates on why this death occurs in **choppy**, **haphazard**, and **messy** forms of war.13 Expenditure in the dissemination of global military force takes a variety of forms. In the context of the Cold War, for example, Mary Kaldor’s (1981, 4) work on The Baroque Arsenal describes how the superlative ‘offspring of a marriage between private enterprise and the state’ proved costly in both **military** and **economic** terms. For Bataille, t**his is only part of the story.** The process of accumulation during the Cold War promoted a variety of different forms of expenditure (including the buildup of **unsustainable** arms in the **U**nited **S**tates and Soviet Union) such as the spread of **small arms**, the growth of **p**rivate **m**ilitary **c**ontractor**s**, and the diffusion of **network** and **technological** warfare (Duffield 2001). These developments, while heterogeneous in source and character, constituted **new modes** of expenditure that promoted the rise of new conflicts and processes wars. Even this process, however, becomes linked to the accumulating dynamics of luxurious war, as low-intensity conflicts slowly **integrate** into the functioning of the global economic system. Indeed, a number of subterranean economies (or, in Bataille’s sense, restricted economies) **thrive** on these developments (Kaldor 2006). In this case, the link between war and the process of accumulation is largely unremarkable. Rather than expending in war, the **investment** in war becomes **profitable**, linked to the very capacity of states to grow. However, the excesses generated by such a system – pockets of **armed resistance**, **insurgency**, **unanticipated consequences** of the growth of global militaries – also create **new outlets** for expenditure often inciting greater involvement by Western militaries (Graham 2011; Duffield 2002). Military expenditure thus integrates with economic life, encouraging the proliferation of **military force**, **technology**, and **new types of conflict**. These, in turn, occasionally induce other forms of expenditure in the form of military intervention. In this sense, the apparent costliness of contemporary wars such as Iraq may be read as a symptom of luxurious war rather than as a strategic blunder (Stiglitz 2008). The growth of ‘riskless’ war also conforms to the structure of luxurious war. Riskless war takes a number of forms from emphasizing network-centric war, **unmanned** aerial **vehicles**, **precision munitions**, and **enhanced targeting** devices (Bousquet 2010; Duffield 2002). While on the surface this concept has the ethical merit of minimizing the casualties of armed conflict, there is little evidence to support this claim (Shaw 2005). Moreover, the ethical commitments involved in this form of war come into conflict when the ‘risk-free’ means of warfare end up repeatedly endangering human life. As Patricia Owens (2003) has demonstrated, the normalization of collateral violence and the distribution of risk in ‘riskless’ war are decidedly uneven. However, for Bataille, the ‘productive’ orientation of luxurious war masks this effect, both because war’s productivity renders such violence insensible and because ‘riskless’ war merely displaces the expenditure of war into new forms. Moreover, ‘risklessness’ reveals the **libidinal** investment in luxurious war because the very effort to abolish ‘risk’ implies the need to improve the **productivity** of war, to extend war into **new domains**. In other words, ‘riskless’ war strengthens the attachment to war while expending excess into the process of reducing ‘risk.’ This reduction of ‘risk’ **paradoxically** enhances the ‘utility’ of war, as the damages of war become increasingly peripheral. In this way, ‘riskless’ forms of war deployed in humanitarian and military situations transform ‘**accidents**,’ ‘**misuses**,’ or even ‘**uses’** of **violent tech**nology into an acceptable element of freer less-violent global society while simultaneously enhancing the attractiveness of war as a solution to political problems. (Owens 2003). In the end, the tremendous energies expended in rendering war ‘riskless’ simply **displace** and **conceal** the expenditures of war. This connects to another aspect of luxurious war: **its carelessness**. Many discussions of contemporary war focus on the role of precision weaponry and the efficient calibration of new technology (Bousquet 2010). As Judith Butler (2010) has pointed out, this ‘precision’ only matters for particular lives that count. The ‘precision’ of the technics of war is thus complemented by a ‘carelessness’ with respect to the deployment of precision technology. This distribution is certainly organized, but it nonetheless renders only particular lives as intelligible or worthy-of-care (Kaag and Kaufman 2009). This attenuation follows closely Bataille’s description of the dangers of a war that disavows excess in two ways. On the one hand, the tremendous expenditure on technology, which was referred to above, is used to **refine** and **miniaturize** the destructive capacity of weaponry. On the other hand, the elimination of expenditure in war also reduces the attentiveness to the horizon of war since the ‘precision’ of technology supposedly resolves these discrepancies. Consequently, ‘carelessness’ expands as a dimension of war and the very omnipresence of ‘**precise’** methods of warfare produces new forms of **anxiety**, **fear**, and political **conflict**. In effect, this **militarizes** the public sphere (Jabri 2006) because the scope of luxurious war includes new domains of political life from disaster relief efforts to routine police efforts (Duffield 2002). In this way, the expenditure of war becomes a central feature of political life as the domains of military practice **permeate** both traditional armed forces operations and humanitarian efforts. These three developments (the diffusion, risklessness, and carelessness of war) are products of the **transformation of war** into an **accumulative** activity. While luxurious war clearly engenders new conflicts, ethical uncertainties, and militarized terrains, it also spurs the creation of **new forms** of **political governance**. The Responsibility to Protect is one example of a form of governance that surfaces within this horizon of luxurious war. The Responsibility to Protect is a cluster of axioms that **invoke**, **reify**, **extend**, and **augment flows** of luxurious war in relation to humanitarianism. The dynamics of luxurious war therefore structure the protocols, norms, and mandates of the Responsibility to Protect and, consequently, luxurious war delimits the efficacy of international humanitarianism.

**Nation states organize themselves in terms of axioms to maximize accumulation from conflict – this process normalizes warfare as a constant experience of the political economy rendering all political life obsolete if it fails to succumb to the axiomatic standard of productivity**

**Meiches ’13 –** Benjamin, Department of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins University, (“The Responsibility to Protect and luxurious war”, pp.227-233, http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcss20) – sel

Axiomatic responsibility While Bataille offers valuable insights into the contingent evolution of warfare, he does not thoroughly discuss how this evolution implicates efforts to govern war. In this regard, Deleuze and Guattari’s development of the concept of the axiomatic, which they describe as a mode of governance emerging in response to the flux and indeterminacy of global politics, provides a complement to Bataille’s theory of war. The axiomatic explains how the choppiness of luxurious war shapes the paradigm of **global governance**. For Deleuze and Guattari (1986, 454), an axiomatic ‘deals directly with purely **functional elements** and relations whose nature is not specified, and which are immediately realized in highly varied domains simultaneously.’ In contrast, classical conceptions of sovereignty depend on a notion of **transcendent authority**, which ‘**overcodes’** the activities ongoing within the boundaries of the state. The Responsibility to Protect’s move away from the classic articulation of **sovereignty** already alludes to its **axiomatic** character. Indeed, read as an axiomatic, the Responsibility to Protect consists largely of a series of axioms that describe specific **functions**, **regulations**, or **protocols** that determine whether or not a state respects its population. In general, the axioms of the Responsibility to Protect attempt to govern the excesses and swerves of luxurious war. In doing so, they repress the expenditure of this excess, which returns in the form of haphazard military **expenditure**. For example, many advocates of the Responsibility to Protect decry the indeterminate status of the doctrine as a failure of international governance. However, the very indeterminacy of the Responsibility to Protect reflects the **choppy**, **haphazard**, and **situational tendencies** of luxurious war. Moreover, the indeterminacy of the Responsibility to Protect enables the provisional application of military power in response to emergent conflicts. The Responsibility to Protect thus responds to the dissemination and multiplication of low intensity conflict via military expenditure. The incipient character of conflicts within luxurious war is thus mirrored in the **conditional endorsement** of military action by the Responsibility to Protect. In this way, the apparent indeterminacy of the Responsibility to Protect is an expression of the mode of political response suited to luxurious war. For example, while France and Russia have both been criticized for abusing the indeterminacy of the Responsibility to Protect in their respectively threatened and actualized military interventions into Myanmar and Georgia (Bellamy 2010), this critique fails to recognize that in both these contexts the ambiguity of the Responsibility to Protect enabled military expenditure as a technique of global governance. Furthermore, both an emergent conflict and the process of military intervention are **manifestations** of luxurious war because the deployment of military force is a mode of **expenditure**, which serves to dampen or inhibit the expenditure ongoing in a political conflict. Military action under the Responsibility to Protect thus conforms to the structure of luxurious war, which turns expenditure into a mechanism for **accumulation**. In this sense, the Responsibility to Protect takes up luxurious war as its key problematic, but at the same time reinforces the dynamics of luxurious war. Consequently, the debate centered on political authority misses how the axioms of the Responsibility to Protect normalize conditions of luxurious war via the indeterminate, decentralized, and open-ended character of the doctrine.14 When the ICISS (2001, 1) released its initial report on the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect in 2001, the commission clarified that the report was intended to redress ‘the full horror of inaction’ in contexts such as the **Rwanda**, **Bosnia**, and **Somalia**. The **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect derived many of its central concepts from the work of Francis Deng (1996, xi) who argued, ‘the notion of sovereignty must be put to work and **reaffirmed** to meet the challenges of the times in accordance with accepted standards of **human dignity’** (see also Orford 2011, 5–17). For Deng, the post-World War II system began a slow erosion of national sovereignty, which compromised many conflict management efforts. By characterizing sovereignty as a **positive obligation**, Deng (1996, 33) claimed that any ‘government that allows its citizens to **suffer in a vacuum** of responsibility for moral leadership cannot claim sovereignty in an effort to keep the outside world from stepping in to offer protection.’ Deng’s work referenced a series of struggles, initiated by Dag Hammarskjöld, to expand the executive powers of the United Nations in order to address conflicts surfacing in the wake of decolonization (Orford 2011). This debate challenged the accepted understanding of sovereignty and placed the question of global political authority at the center of international dialog. The ICISS report appropriated Deng's work in refashioning responsibility as the cornerstone of sovereignty (Orford 2011). While the release of the ICISS report was eclipsed by 11 September 2001, the report resurfaced at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, which affirmed the principle that ‘each individual State has the responsibility to protects its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,’ and continued by stating that ‘the international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility’ (United Nations General Assembly 2005). Most recently, the Responsibility to Protect appeared in Security Council Resolution 1073, which reiterated ‘the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians’ (United Nations Security Council 2011). The current ‘status’ of the Responsibility to Protect is difficult to locate precisely (Bellamy 2011). While the concept was widely endorsed at the United Nations, there have been few interventions based explicitly on the principles of the Responsibility to Protect. In many cases, uses of the Responsibility to Protect have been criticized as inconsistent with the normative vision of the doctrine (Bellamy 2011; Evans 2008). The process of adopting the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect conforms to an axiomatic logic of ‘**addition** and **subtraction**.’ The axioms of the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect emerge as ‘primary statements,’ on particular relationships in global politics. Axioms add or subtract depending on their degree of responsiveness to the **exigencies** of an emergent situation.15 The reconceptualization of sovereignty by Deng, for example, emerges in response to an apparent disjunction between the description of sovereignty and the political power of developing states. Similarly, the decision to rely on the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect in the case of **NATO intervention** in Libya, in spite of the African Union’s opposition to military involvement, demonstrates how the ‘**operational imperatives’** of one axiom of the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect, in this case the emphasis on multilateralism, is **replaced** by another axiom. The contingent application of the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect is therefore not a failure of legal execution, as Gareth Evans (2008, 35) maintains, but an **essential function** or practice of the form of governance produced by the report (Grovogui 2012). The ICISS (2001, 11) report supplies a number of axioms for describing political danger. The Responsibility to Protect responds to the ‘stark and undeniable reality,’ that ‘millions of human beings remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies, state repressions, and state collapse.’ Each of these realities ‘cannot be understood without reference to such “root” causes as poverty, political repression, and uneven distribution of resources’ (ICISS 2001, 22). To solve these deficiencies, the Responsibility to Protect proposes enhancing democratic institutions by providing assistance such as election monitoring, ensuring broad based power-sharing via party formation, resolving economic deprivation using international loans and foreign aid, encouraging international trade, creating independent judiciaries, and training or educating domestic security forces (ICISS 2001, 22). The report also suggests several procedures for responding to proximate causes of conflict, including a number of diplomatic efforts, fact-finding missions, positive trade incentives, financial sanctions, conflict mediation, and legal action in the International Criminal Court (ICISS 2001, 23). Together, this menu of options creates the opportunity for ‘disparate actors working strategically’ to coordinate in preventing conflict (ICISS 2001, 25). Despite this menu, the report never describes the source of the ‘stark and undeniable reality’ of human insecurity. While the report certainly highlights variables that contribute to human insecurity, it links all of these variables to one location: the state. Indeed, the report clarifies that this is ‘a dangerous world,’ rife with ‘weaknesses of state structures and institutions in many countries,’ and internal conflicts ‘made more complex and lethal by modern technology,’ which take place in ‘desperate[ly] poor societies’ where ‘the state’s monopoly over the means of violence is lost’ (ICISS 2001, 4). Human vulnerability results from ‘campaigns of terror,’ ‘state fragmentation,’ and inefficiencies in domestic markets that increase the value of plundering precious resources (ICISS 2001, 4). This danger is global: ‘in an interdependent world, in which security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities, the existence of fragile states, failing states, states who through weakness or ill-will harbour those dangerous to others…constitute a risk to people everywhere’ (ICISS 2001, 5). The report views state failure in two different ways. First, failure corresponds to the violation of human rights, welfare, and dignities, which signifies an abrogation of sovereignty by the state in question. Second, failure results from democratic deficits in the structure of the state. These two forms of failure complement one another. State failure causes human insecurity and humanity insecurity reveals a failure in the state (ICISS 2001, 23). Here, the ‘operative statement’ of the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect refers to two dimensions of luxurious war. On the one hand, the report argues that political and economic forces undermine the state’s capacity to protect its denizens. The proliferation of **military forces**, the **permeable nature** of **state boundaries**, and the **diffusion of arms characteristic** of luxurious war reveal the impotence of state structures. On the other, the report views state failure as capable of spreading or circulating within an ‘interdependent world.’ In this way, the rise of conflicts jeopardizes the accumulative dynamics of a global political system. The expenditure of excess in the form of humanitarian or military force thus serves to buttress **accumulation** by reintegrating a crisis zone into **normative economic relations**. In this case, the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect produces an **axiom** that relocates the danger of luxurious war in the disintegration of state authority. In doing so, the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect also establishes an axiom, which supervenes the authority of the state in ubiquitous norms of **human security**. Consequently, the norms of the Responsibility to Protect apply to all states because the very conditions of ‘interdependence’ outlined by the Responsibility to Protect constitutively undermine the ‘**independence’** of any particular state. The decision to intervene thus requires two supplementary axioms. First, one directed towards **non-governmental organizations**, **early warning networks**, and **reporting agencies**, which supply the evidence that determines whether or not the norms of the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect go into effect. These organizations **thrive** in conditions of luxurious war because they depend on imbrications of economic and military relationships (Duffield 2002). Second, a set of ‘situational’ axioms, such as UN Resolution 1073, that depend entirely on the specific elements (states, groups, organizations, individuals) in a crisis. Political dangers are ‘mastered by the **multiplication** of directing axioms’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 462). The contingency of luxurious war shapes the axioms of the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect insofar as they adapt to the **exigencies** of an emergent situation. The invocation of the Responsibility to Protect in **Libya**, for example, appears in connection with other axioms in global politics (concerning **oil**, **the war on terror**ism, etc.) that differentiate it from the application of the Responsibility to Protect in **Syria** despite widespread human misery in both contexts. Another axiomatic dimension of the Responsibility to Protect concerns the definition of sovereignty **itself**. The ICISS (2001, 12) report defines sovereignty as ‘the **legal identity** of a state in international law.’ However, the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect supplements this definition by arguing that any signatory to the UN Charter ‘accepts the responsibilities of membership flowing from that signature’ (ICISS 2001, 13). Signing the Charter commits the state to a new set of **obligations**. As the report puts it: ‘There is no transfer or dilution of state sovereignty. But there is a necessary **re-characterization** involved: from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties’ (ICISS 2001, 13). The dual character of this obligation is important for understanding the relationship between the responsibility to **protect** and **sovereignty**. First, the Responsibility to Protect implies that a state has a primary ‘internal’ obligation to protect and enhance the safety and livelihood of its citizenry (ICISS 2001, 23–24). Second, sufficient protection of citizenry requires that state authorities subject themselves to international scrutiny and, moreover, that each signatory agrees to scrutinize other states. By recoding sovereignty in terms of responsibility, the report establishes a series of new linkages between the state, the **U**nited **N**ations as a representative of the international community, and inchoate dangers to human security. These linkages treat the state as an exclusive template for rendering **political identity intelligible** (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2008). Furthermore, this framework enables **punitive** and **corrective** measures to be deployed against **non-liberal** state. However, while the Responsibility to Protect goes on at length about the obligations the state adopts by signing the UN Charter, the report does not clarify how the UN should successfully exercise its authority and obligate states to intervene (ICISS 2001, 47–50). This adds two elements to the picture. First, any state signing the UN charter not only agrees to abide by the norms of the Responsibility to Protect with regards to its own citizenry, but also implicitly agrees to assist in promoting these standards globally. In effect, the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect creates a **global redundancy**, binding both a particular state and the community of states to the principles of human security. The amorphous character of the UN authority suggests that the propagation of the norms of human security and the liberal state is the primary effect of the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect. At the same time, this norm contains structural indeterminacies concerning – when states are supposed to intervene, what obligations to preserve human security entail, and what constitutes a **sufficiently** liberal state. In this respect, indeterminacy requires the construction of **additional** axioms. Second, the Responsibility to Protect indicates that only states that already adequately protect their citizens may engage in humanitarian action. This criterion maintains that only those states with **excesses** of **wealth**, **military force**, or **resources** may engage in humanitarian activity without placing their own population in jeopardy. In this way, the Responsibility to Protect links the capacity for humanitarian intervention to the existence of excess military and economic resources. Humanitarian action thus becomes an expressive byproduct of excess military force. In this light, it is no surprise that ‘abuses’ of the indeterminacy of the Responsibility to Protect occur (Bellamy 2010) because the conditions of luxurious war subtend the axiom in the report that dictates which states have the authority and the capacity to intervene. In short, the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect augments the value of accumulating military force by linking this to the exercise of **global governance**. Several additional axiomatic features stand out with respect to the redefinition of sovereignty. First, the **R**esponsibility **t**o **P**rotect turns all states into **isomorphic** models of realization for the basic objective of maintaining **human welfare**, **economic circulation**, and **security**. Despite heterogeneous cultures, social structures, and governmental organizations the basic function of the state must conform to the minimal standards of facilitating the health and well-being of the populace. Since this isomorphic character extends to all states, the application of the Responsibility to Protect licenses humanitarian and military efforts ignoring existing antagonism or conflicts between states. The isomorphic status of the state serves to ‘**smooth’** global space into a single operational terrain, with individual states functioning as **service centers** for the administration of human welfare. This reconstitution of global space turns states into components of ‘a **war machine** of which they themselves were only the parts’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 469).16 Political sovereignty, in this regard, is a secondary feature produced by the connection to large **flexible**, **heterogeneous**, and **riskless** militaries that may rapidly and precisely operate in any area of the globe.17 In this respect, advocates of the Responsibility to Protect who object to the traditional framework of sovereignty (Evans 2008) end up endorsing axioms of the Responsibility to protect, which simply augment the capacity of powerful states to make provisional decisions about whether or not to intervene in political conflicts. The repositioning of luxurious war at the center of humanitarianism is also reflected in the ICISS report’s description of military action. The report requires that military action occur only in ‘extreme and exceptional cases,’ where the principle of non-intervention guides the process of military mobilization (ICISS 2001). To this end, the responsibility stipulates that military action must satisfy six principles: **right authority**, **just cause**, **right intention**, **last resort**, **proportional means**, and **reasonable prospects** (ICISS 2001).18 Together, these principles enable military intervention by legally legitimate coalitions in situations of extreme human insecurity with appropriate uses of force. The Responsibility to Protect also provides substantial detail on the procedures for military intervention. The report begins by acknowledging that humanitarian military action has ‘different objectives from both traditional war-fighting and traditional peacekeeping’ (ICISS 2001, 57). According to the report, only after the failure of preventative deployments does a military force get ‘turned into an intervention tool’ (ICISS 2001, 58). Put differently, it is only after a series of minor expenditures take place that war emerges as a viable mode of expenditure and military intervention becomes a possibility. Furthermore, once military engagement begins, the Responsibility to Protect clarifies that all interventions should be directed by coalition forces with a ‘common political resolve,’ which harmonizes their humanitarian agendas (ICISS 2001, 58). Any effort requires ‘a clear and unambiguous mandate’ to ensure sufficient force commitment from participating states (ICISS 2001, 60). However, this mandate must ‘allow the executing military commander to identify his mission and his tasks properly and to propose an operational concept which promises quick success’ and this also prompts an enormous commitment of resources as a ‘clear signal of resolve and intent’ (ICISS 2001, 61). The document clarifies the essential role of political oversight in any military operation so as to ensure stringent observation of the principles of proportionality and protection of human life. Nonetheless, the report notes the desirability of a ‘quick success in military operations […] achieved by surprise, overwhelming force and through concentration of all military efforts’ and, where this is impossible, by keeping missions ‘especially focused’ with ‘key military and political pressure points identified and targeted’ (ICISS 2001, 62–63). The report also clarifies that ‘force protection of the intervention force is important, but should never be allowed to become the principal objective’ (ICISS 2001, 63). A proper intervention therefore requires preventative efforts and the use of coalition forces with broad political oversight. Intervention is nonetheless directed by military commanders with wide discretion to identify operational objectives, in hopefully quick efforts, characterized by significant planning and the deployment of overwhelming concentrations of force that nonetheless target a limited series of key points, with only secondary regard to force protection. Numerous tensions are evident at this point. First, a tactical tension: the Responsibility to Protect wrestles with conflicting objectives in the domain of targeting. On the one hand, the report counsels strict political oversight of a military operation that targets a limited set of crucial military and political points. On the other, the report defers significantly to the imperatives of a military commander tasked, clearly and swiftly demonstrating the political resolve of coalition forces. As a result, the military action called for by the document, while theoretically constrained by proportional use and the need for human security, is sufficiently indeterminate to enable a broad spectrum of **war-fighting** actions depending on the **principles**, **aims**, and **needs** of a military commander. In essence, the report’s protocols are constructed around the possibility of an oscillation or surge in military force, which also compromises the delicate use of military force advocated by the rest of the report. Second, the report is struck by conflicting desires concerning the form of military engagement. In one case, the report counsels an extreme buildup, concentration, and use of force in order to demonstrate resolve and right intention, and to quickly defeat enemy forces. At the same time, the report stipulates that any use of military force should remain at a minimum level required by a particular conflict. Once again, the report establishes conflicting imperatives for organizing military forces. The drive towards military expenditure, which the report concedes is occasionally necessary, rests upon a group of explicit restraints. However, this also conflicts with a desire for decisive, resolved, and swift military action. The report is caught between a desire for an extreme deployment of excessive force in order to defeat or terrify enemy forces and the need to respect a state's imperatives and observe the principle of proportionality. This inconsistency is built into the structure of the report and facilitates the use of military expenditure in some contexts and inaction in others (Dunne and Gifkins 2011). Third, the report does not explain where or how states will procure their intervention forces, but presupposes the existence of a highly mobile, concentrated, efficient fighting force capable of adeptly targeting conflict sites anywhere on the globe. Put simply, the Responsibility to Protect’s assumption about the existence of military force merely reflects the existing arrangement of global war-fighting capacity. The global permeation of Western military power becomes a crucial principle of the Responsibility to Protect and, thus, the guidelines for military action rest firmly in the constraints of existing military force. Moreover, this presupposition also suggests that the Responsibility to Protect only seeks to modulate the aim or role of these military forces or, put differently, it simply modifies the mode of military expenditure while leaving the broader dynamics of luxurious war intact. Coupled with the report’s redefinition of sovereignty, the Responsibility to Protect, authorizes the conditions of luxurious war by appealing to the ‘force’ of existing military arrangements to underwrite the protection of human security.

**The 1AC’s attempt to consume and control the impossible object is the root cause of sovereign violence – the role of the ballot should be to reward the team that best communicates the truth of experience. The role of the judge is to be a communication scholar assessing the performance of meaning exchanged in the debate space**

**Lee ’01 –** Joo Heung, qualification, (“Sovereign ‘Subjectivity’ In Bataille”, pp.41-44, [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2001.11007316)](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2001.11007316)m) – sel \*\*modified for gendered language; edits in brackets

The Object as **NOTHING** The subject is concerned with knowledge, and knowledge requires that the subject maintain its integrity amidst the ravishing **movement of time**. The barriers that the subject erects to this end come in the form of taboos that preserve the discontinuity between **subject** and **object**. In contrast, passivity is dynamic in that the subject who renounces the project of knowledge moves outside of him or herself into the tumultuous world of continuity. The etymological root of "passion" just adds further credibility to the attribution of passivity to the subject's disintegration. Nevertheless, even a disintegrated subject is not altogether **independent** of objectivity. This is because unknowing is a matter not of renunciation (which would still involve the active will) but of **dis-solution**. The impossible object, then, cannot represent a mere absence (as is often the case in negative theology) but must participate in the play of **presence** and **absence**. In contrast to the serious project of reason, which is a matter of **accumulation**, communicative experience is a matter of **dissipation**. Like the heat that often signifies passion, communication is fundamentally a **process of loss.** Bataille embraces this loss in a drunken revelry that, far from **selfindulgent**, is literally a **self-sacrifice**. The subject **sacrifices** ~~him or~~ herself [themselves] to the movement of continuity. This happens when an object that is simultaneously **absent** and **present** confronts the subject. Because the subject's anticipation dissolves into NOTHING when confronted by such an object, ~~his or her~~ [their] self-importance becomes suddenly ridiculous. In the ensuing **laughter** or **tears**, the subject is restored to the world of continuity. Sacred, poetic, and erotic objects all act in the same manner: the subject anticipates a presence that miraculously dissolves into an absence. But how should one characterize this absence? Bataille writes: "this NOTHING has little to do with nothingness. Nothingness is a metaphysical concept. The NOTHING I speak of is a datum of experience, and is considered here only insofar as experience implies it."'" Bataille is careful to avoid the abstractions that characterize metaphysical thought. Above all, he wants to remain faithful to **experience**. And Bataille insists that experience testifies to both **presence** and **absence**. Strictly speaking, the only experience of NOTHING that we can have - and even this experience is only possible vicariously - is that of **death**. If the desire for NOTHING is the positive anticipation of death (at this juncture, one cannot help but to hear echoes of Heidegger's Sein zum Tode), it becomes susceptible to a kind of metaphysical **reification**. But, on the other hand, it is difficult to see how we could desire NOTHING if death was merely a **negative phenomenon**. Ultimately, Bataille resolves this difficulty by invoking the play of **presence** and **absence** that dissolves beings in the luxury of **communication**. Just as the impact of poetry stems as much from the empty spaces as from the signs themselves, the positive miracle - though associated with presence - derives its force from absence. The absence in question is of an anticipated reality, a reality shattered by the emergence of an unexpected presence. Such is the case when a loved one thought dead miraculously appears, resulting in the happy tears that Bataille finds fascinating. Similarly, the negative miracle of death cannot be an object of experience unless it is **represented**. Death marks the end of experience, so one can only experience death through various ruses of **vicarious substitution**. Whether the miracle is positive or negative, what matters is the **juxtaposition** of **reality** and **impossibility**. The reality of an impossibility - whether it is death or the winning lottery ticket - leads to our dissolution in **tears**. But tears are but one way that we can respond to an impossible reality. **Laughter**, **ecstasy**, **poetry** - in fact, all of Bataille's privileged forms of communication come about as a result of the exposure to an impossible reality. As real, however, the impossible must be represented as an object - even if the object is a mere vanishing point in the dissolution of subjectivity. The object might be an object of knowledge, but only up to the point that it vanishes and provokes the moment of effusion. In our subjective experience of the object in the field of **positive** and **practical** knowledge, anticipation dissolves into NOTHING at the moment when the possibility of the object is snatched away from us. This is the point of coincidence between **knowing** and **unknowing**. What results from this collision between **reality** and **impossibility** is the objectless depths of **inner experience**. Although inner experience is **objectless**, it is not equivalent to a **pure subjectivity**. This is because it is **subjectless** as well. Unfettered by the subject-object relation that determines knowledge, it would seem that inner experience should be immediate. But immediacy by itself is **not communication**. Communication takes place when the immediate collides with the mediated, when experience collides with the consciousness of experience. Again, Bataille locates value in the process of **un-knowing**. Value resides not in nothingness as such but in the movement of the subject towards **NOTHING**. This movement takes the form of a **surrender**, a complete renunciation of effort. But to what is one surrendering? Essentially, one is surrendering to **NOTHING**. But because NOTHING exceeds the frontiers of representation, our only indication of surrender - after the withdrawal of the object - is a vague feeling of **suffering**, a feeling of being unexpectedly penetrated from outside. Putting aside the sexual undertones of being penetrated for the moment, Bataille' s belief that unfulfilled expectation opens the space in which NOTHING echoes the sentiments of Proust. And for both Bataille and Proust, the **ensuing annihilation** is inextricably tied to time. It is only that Bataille projects expectation into the future, while Proust explores expectation in terms of the voluntary past. Notwithstanding this difference, both Bataille and Proust recognize the significance of time in relation to the collision between **experience** and the **consciousness** of experience. Bataille pays subtle homage to Proust when he writes: "In place of transcendence - and in the utterly deranged and completely empty abyss - ecstasy discloses the identity of reality and ecstasy, identifying the absurd object with the absurd subject and the time-object that destroys by being destroyed with the subject that is destroyed."'' The mutual **laceration** initiated by the "timeobject" cuts across the divisions normally made between various types of **ecstasy**. In mystical bliss and in sexual rapture, in the felicity brought about by involuntary memory and in the anxiety attached to games of chance, it is always a matter of the object of desire inexorably leading the subject to annihilation. The link between **time** and **annihilation** culminates in death. For Bataille, death introduces a break where an isolated being loses him or herself [themself] in "a reality that transcends the common limitations. So **unlimited** is it that it is not even a thing: it is **nothing**."' 2 Death lacerates specific existence, inaugurating a reality that cannot be reduced to the reflection of things. To embrace death is to desire the **impossible**. And what else is sovereignty but the renunciation of the possibilities that constitute **servile existence?** Time passes, **ravishing** everything that we devote our lives to constructing. The havoc wrought by time extends beyond the products of our labor to our very **identities**. The chronic annihilation effected by the passage of time will ultimately be total, for at the end of time awaits **death**. Death definitively shatters the illusion of discontinuous existence, an illusion meticulously fabricated from **past experiences** and **future projects**. All of these experiences and projects will be as nothing. But for Bataille, this is not a reason for melancholy lamentation. The Sisyphean task of our lives is nothing else than an instantiation of the Kantian definition of the **sublime**: purposiveness without purpose is the very definition of **human existence**. Time consumes the substance of our lives, emitting the **incandescent nothingness** that is our truth. It is of little consequence whether this nothingness is described as our **individual insignificance** in relation to the totality (as it is in Buddhist thought), as the **sudden disruption** of the identity constructed by voluntary memory (as it is in Proust), as the empty space left by the **death of God**, as the decomposition of the flesh in **death** and in sex, or as the vertiginous abyss opened by the holocaust of words. What matters is that, confronted by the truth of nothingness, the individual moves outside the limits imposed by **reason** and **communicates**.

**Securitization as a knowledge of NATO’s technocratic apparatus invests in the ritualistic spectacle of governing the myth of security.**

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (**NATO**), since the implosion of the former Soviet Union (1991) and the disappearance of its supposed mortal enemy, on whom it constructed its own military, geopolitical and warring space, has been re-fabricating its own identity and functions. And has struggled to retain its status quo ante power position inside a changing global security environment in taking an active part in various conflicts (**security operations**) around the world. In this transformative exercise the Alliance has modified its security language and narrative employing a Critical Security Studies language, and in this process has adapted its language, its security dilemma, and its securitization process to its own **subjective reading** of the **‘out there security/insecurity reality’** in order to reproduce itself as a human structure.

In this workout the Alliance operates as a **power-knowledge-security-total institution** structure which is interested to produce and sell to its own **NATO audience** an insecurity-security **self-referential narrative** which permits to make itself indispensable for the maintenance of security in NATO’s territories. This means that as a power-knowledge-security-total institution structure (1) it has legitimate power to get X to do something that X would not otherwise do, and has power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by **shaping** their **perceptions**, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they **accept their role** in the existing order of things (Lukes 2005: 11; as it will be developed in this paper this idea of power overlaps with the concepts of bourgeois ideology of Barthes, of ideology of Zizek, of the distribution of the sensible of Ranciere, and the idea of identity formation and cultural system); (2) it produces through the use of a **technocratic apparatus** (Galimberti 2011) a security-insecurity knowledge, and defines and certifies as reliable knowledgei what insecurity is (the **existential threat**), and the protocol which must be adopted for the security operation; (3) it has recognized legitimate power and the monopoly of the use of force, therefore it can take and carry security actions (war, crisis management operations, etc); and (4) as a total institution (Goffman 2010) it administers the life of the people who lives in its structure, and impose an ‘**habitus’** (Bourdieu 2005) to its members, and the same members identify themselves with the same structure. Meaning that their **identity is shaped by the very total institution**, like the case of this paper in which NATO moulds, influences and affects the construction and the perpetuation of NATO-ness. As a result the **NATOcitizen** translate the ‘out there security/insecurity reality’ as NATO does therefore confirm the point that NATO is again **a cultural system** (Geertz 1973).

The above introduction opens ontological and epistemological questions regarding what insecurity and security is. This is because NATO, along its narrating activity, do not provide a straight and objective definition of what security is, and we have to assume that **security means ‘NATO’**, or living under or with NATO protection, whilst for insecurity the Alliance narrative moves from the extreme of an ‘armed attack against one or more of them (the parties) in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all’ (Art. 5, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. 4th April 1949) to ‘the risk of…’ which appears on the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept.

However, there is a specific important aspect which passes through the image of an armed attack and ‘the risk of…’, and it is represented by the **constant element of ‘anxiety’** which (1) is present in the etymological meaning of ‘security’ too; and (2) do play a pivotal point around which turns this paper that want to demonstrate that security is a myth which sustains a **cultural system** in which the spectacle of the myth (US Army and NATO operation ‘Dragoon Ride’) has an important function.

II. SECURITY AS A MYTH

Analysing the evolution of the NATO’s New Strategic Concepts (1999 and 20100) from the implosion of the former Soviet Union up to the recent 2010 text, what emerges is that the Alliance has been reformulating its security dilemma in order to prevent a security paradox, meaning that the security response to an insecurity event is not adequate at all.

A security dilemma refers to a situation wherein two or more states are drawn into conflict, possibly even war, over security concerns, even though none of the states actually desire conflict. Essentially, the security dilemma occurs when two or more states each feel insecure in relation to other states. For Booth and Wheeler the security dilemma is a complex relationship of both **psychological** and material dimensions, and ‘is a two-level predicament in relations between states and other actors, with each level consisting of two related lemmas (or propositions that can be assumed to be valid) which force decision makers to choose between them. The first and basic level consists of a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions and capabilities of the others; the second and derivative level consists of a dilemma of response about the most rational way of responding. First level: a dilemma of interpretation is the predicament facing decisionmakers when they are confronted, on matters affecting security, with a choice between two significant and usually (but not always) undesirable alternatives about the military policies and political postures of other entities. This dilemma of interpretation is the result of the perceived need to make a decision in the existential condition of unresolvable uncertainty about the motives, intentions and capabilities of the others. Those responsible have to decide whether perceived military developments are for defensive or self-protection purposes only (to enhance security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to seek to change the status quo to their advantage). Second level: a dilemma of response logically begins when the dilemma of interpretation has been settled. Decision-makers then need to determine how to react. Should they signal, by words and deeds, that they will react in kind, for deterrent purposes? Or should they seek to signal reassurance? If the dilemma of response is based on misplaced suspicion regarding the motives and intentions of others actors, and decision-makers react in a militarily confrontational manner, then they risk creating a significant level of mutual hostility when none was originally intended by either party; if the response is based on misplaced trust, there is a risk they will be exposed to coercion by those with hostile intentions. When leaders resolve their dilemma of response in a manner that creates a spiral of mutual hostility, when neither wanted it, a situation has developed which we call the security paradox’ (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 4-5).

Therefore, what do play an important role in the definition of what **security** is (because this is the function of the security dilemma) depends on psychological and material dimensions, on interpretation, and on power. Thus, the subjective approach to security is confirmed.

In addition, the Alliance has not yet defined the meaning of security but has always presented its own meanings of security (the NATO’s strategic concepts) and has produced its own system of communication. And this contrast with the fact that the very referent of the term ‘security’ (freedom from danger, fear, anxiety, destitution, and so on), is represented only by its etymological meaning which **bears strong emotions**. ‘Security’ is derived from the Latin ‘securitas’ and in its turn from ‘sine’ (= without) + ‘cura’ (= anxiety, worry). Therefore, the above reasoning demonstrates that the relation between a power-knowledge structure like NATO, a term (security), its meaning and its usage is the same relation which exists in the concept of **myth** developed by Roland Barthes (2000) for whom the myth is a system of communication defined as a **‘second order semiological system’**.

For Barthes, the ‘first order semiological system’ is formed by the ‘1.Signifier’ (acoustic image), ‘2.Signified’ (concept) and ‘3.Sign’ (relation between concept and image). This first order represents a linguistic system in which, once applied to the term ‘security’, it produces that: (1) ‘1.Signifier’ is the written word ‘security’; ‘2.Signified’ is represented by the etymological meaning of security: ‘securitas’ (without anxiety); (3) ‘3. Sign’ is what I call ‘security-securitas’, which represent the ‘referent’ in this paper.

However, the myth is a peculiar system because it is a constructed from a semiological chain which existed before it: it is a second order semiological system. That which is **a sign** (the associative total of a concept and an image) in the first system, **becomes a mere signifier in the second**. The material of **mythical speech**, however different at the start, are reduced to a pure signifying function as soon as they are caught by myth. Whatever it deals only with alphabetical or pictorial writing, myth wants to see in them only a sum of signs, a global sign, the final term of a first semiological chain. And it is precisely this final term which will become the first term of a greater system This lateral shift is essential for the analysis of mith. In myth there are two semiological systems, one of which is staggered in relation to the other: a linguistic system, the language, which Barthes calls language-object, because it is the language which myth gets hold of in order to build its own system; and myth itself, which Barthes calls **‘metalanguage’**, because it is a second language in which one speaks about the first. When he reflects on a metalanguage, the semiologist no longer needs to ask himself questions about the composition of the language-object, he no longer has to take into account the details of the linguistic schema; he will only need to know its total term, or global sign, and only as this term lends itself to mith. This is why the semiologist is entitled to treat in the same way writing and pictures: what he retains from them is the fact that they are both signs and they constitute a language-object.

Therefore the ‘second order semiological system’ of the myth of security is made up of: ‘I SIGNIFIER’ is provided by ‘3.Sign’ (security-securitas)’; ‘II SIGNIFIED’ is the result of the political, intellectual, elaboration of ‘security-securitas’ by an **epistemological community** (in the case of his paper this is represented by the Alliance technocratic apparatus), which **transforms and recreates the meaning** and practices of what constitute **anxiety-existential threat**; ‘III SIGN is the characteristic and peculiar image/picture that the sign will assume which changes in time and space.

As a result, while in the linguistic system the word ‘security’ has only one referent represented by its etymological meaning ‘securitas, in the metalanguage system the term ‘security’ is the result of a **linguistic-narrative fabrication**, **operated by a power-knowledge structure**, and therefore change with time and space.

In this specific context the step from the first to the second semiological order, then the **very fabrication of the myth security**, is possible through a technique defined as securitization process which allow the powerknowledge-security-total institution structure (1) to define a human even as an **existential threat** to the survival of the community it protects; (2) to add the element of ‘emergency’ which blocks any external (of the structure) tentative to criticize the move; and (3) to present the myth security as ‘reliable knowledge’, therefore, ‘legitimate security knowledge’ii when in reality is only an ‘**image of knowledge’**iii.

For Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde security ‘is the move that takes politics beyond the conventional rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying action outside the normal bounds of political procedure)’ (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 23-24). In this way, the process of **securitization is more than a speech act** (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 24-26; Balzacq 2011) through which an issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures, and justifying actions outside the bounds of the political procedure (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 23-24). It is rather ‘an articulated assemblage of practices whereby **heuristic artefacts** (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thought, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by **investing the referent object with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion** that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development’ (Balzacq 2011: 3).

However, once the security myth is created by the security actor (NATO) it needs a ritual, a **spectacle** in order ‘to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thought, and intuitions)’. And paraphrasing Huysmans (2006) who see in the process of securitization a technique of governing danger, I see in the ‘articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (**metaphors**, **policy tools**, **image repertoires**, **analogies**, **stereotypes**, **emotions**, etc.)’ are condensed in the ritual-spectacle of the myth security, a technique of **governing the myth**. And this technique of governing the myth has to be understood inside the framework provided by the concept of the sacralization of politics, which, according to Gentile (2007), consists of bestowing a **sacred character** to a **secular entity**, as the nation, the state, the race, the political party and the leader. In these situations, politics become a religion because, through a complex of beliefs, expressed by the use of myths, rituals, and symbols, it pretends to define the meaning and the final end of the individual and the collective existence (Gentile 2007: vii).

**Alt card**

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However, one of the military implication that NATO’s has to overcome in this update is to win **the battle of narrative** (Soligan 2009), meaning that the Alliance has to concentrate in its spectacle-ritual performance to convince its audience of its utility and indispensability for their security in a new environment in which the NATO’s security myth is represented by ‘the risk of…’.

Therefore, in this new securitization process in which any ‘risk of…’ insecurity threat is identified, the **ritual and spectacles** attached to the Alliance’s **security myth** do play the important role to explain what security means. Thus, the approach **we have to** take, must be dynamic, and we have to ‘**consume the myth** according to the very ends built into its structure: **the reader lives the myth as a story at once true and real**’ (Barthes 2000: 128). Only in this way we can understand that the power-knowledge-security-total institution structure aims to **discipline our sensible order** practising the ‘distribution of the sensible’ which, according to Ranciere, is the law governing the sensible order that parcels out places and forms of participation in a common world by first establishing the modes of perception within which these are inscribed. It produces a system of self-evident facts of perception based on a set horizons and modalities of what is visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done. The ‘distribution’ refers both to forms of inclusion and to form of exclusion. The ‘sensible’ refers to what is ‘aistheton’ (sensible) or capable of being apprehended by the senses (Ranciere 2014: 89).

In conclusion, it emerges that the power of the myth is to shape perceptions, cognitions, and preferences of people in such a way that they **accept their role in the existing order of things** (Lukes 2005: 11), and to **make believe** (Walton 1990). And the myth of security (the process of securitization) is converted into (1) a **cultural system**, where culture ‘denotes an historically transmitted patter of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life’ (Geertz 1973: 89), whilst a cultural system is composed of ‘culture patterns – religious, philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, ideological – are “programs”; they provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social and psychological processes, much as genetic system provide such a template for the organization of organic processes’ (Geertz 1973: 216); (2) a technique of governmentality, defined by Huysmans as technique of governing danger where ‘technique refers simultaneously to (i) a particular method of doing an activity which usually involves practical skills that are developed through training and practice, (ii) a mode of procedure in an activity, and (iii) the disposition of things according to a regular plan or design (…). It is embedded in training, routine, and technical knowledge and skills, as well as technological artefacts’ (Huysmans 2006: 9); and (3) an **ideology** the function of which ‘is **not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel**’ (Zizek 2008: 45).

At the end, as Barthes argues, it is the myth (which is produced through the securitization process) which becomes a **bourgeois ideology**. ‘As the bourgeois ideology is defined by the abandonment of the same “bourgeois”, myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things: in it, things lose the memory that they once were made’ (Barthes 2000: 142). And the myth-bourgeois ideology **represented by NATO’s security** achieves the particular ideology effect of **persuading us that a certain order of the world**, a certain way of doing things, **is given by nature**, rather than the result of human action on the world that could have been otherwise. Thus, paraphrasing Barthes (2000: 143): in passing from history to nature, NATO-security myth acts economically: it **abolishes the complexity** of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essence s, it does away with all dialects, with any going back beyond what is immediately visible, it organizes a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves, like the image of the ‘Dragoon Ride’ operation

**Reject their norms!**

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Bataille contrasts community as a structure which aims at **securing its permanence**, denying or disavowing death, with community in a more vital sense meaning a coming together of human beings in an immediate awareness of mortality and of their radical ‘insufficiency’. It seems that any established community – before it grows into an entity that could be called a culture, society or nation – is founded in death, in a painful awareness of mortality. Yet, gradually, through the erection of monuments and other barricades against time, as well as against the surrounding spaces, a ‘community’ comes to imagine itself as necessary and permanent. Such a community becomes hierarchical; it is ruled by a head. Just as all of its members are ruled, **they must also rule themselves**, must learn to negate their passions and use their head. All community is rooted in death – always touches death – but as communities become monocephalic, their relationship to death becomes one of negation rather than affirmation. Egyptian society under the pharaohs or god-kings is the archetype of this process. Of the great pyramids dotted along the Nile, Bataille writes, ‘no enterprise cost a greater amount of labour than this one, which wanted to halt the flow of time . . . they transcend the intolerable void that time opens under men’s feet, for all possible movement is halted in their geometric surfaces. IT SEEMS THAT THEY MAINTAIN WHAT ESCAPES FROM THE DYING MAN’ (Bataille, 1985, p. 216, emphasis in original). Only as community organises itself through a head, through authority and through military sovereignty and repression, does **it become de-vitalised and stagnant**: its repressive measures extend, becoming increasingly insidious and sophisticated as **it can no longer immediately inspire, impassion or enchant its members**. We might accept that this is loosely the case, or is at least a plausible general narrative, but it raises important questions. First, was there ever a community that did not depend upon a repressive authority structure? Relatedly, was there ever, and could there ever be, a community that genuinely impassions its members? Bataille’s answer – at least at the time of Acéphale – is an unequivocal yes to both of these questions. The ‘pre-foundations’ of Christianity, powerfully visualised in Van der Weyden’s Deposition of Christ (1435) as consisting of a distraught Mary Magdalene, with Peter, Joseph of Arimathea and a few others removing a corpse from a cross; the ‘pre-foundations’ of Buddhism (Siddhartha’s abandonment of a life of comfort and pleasure to confront suffering); the springing of Dionysus from the dying womb of Semele, murdered by Zeus: all of these seem to fulfil Bataille’s notion of the vital community of death, a sense of community so forceful that it provokes the ecstatic frenzy of its followers yet still cannot endure, lapsing into memorialised ‘culture’ with the passage of time (Bataille, 1985, pp. 205–206). In making the distinction between a vital, ‘impossible’ community and the devitalised vestiges of such a community securing itself through ideological and military structures, Bataille develops important sets of relations: between the fullness or totality of being, and the fragmented or mutilated state of individual existence; between the active accumulation of knowledge and its suspension in ecstatic ‘non-knowledge’; between an ‘external’ perspective examining life in terms of substance and objects, and an internal or ‘inner experience’ in which substances and objects are felt to ‘dissolve’, where the energies, forces and flows that are obscured by objects are felt with irresistible intensity. These sets of relations are vital for an understanding of Bataille’s notion of community, and also for his writings on mysticism and inner experience; they also form the basis from which Bataille develops his more systematic notions of general and restricted economy in The Accursed Share . Bataille’s position on the possibility of community springs from his passionate anti-individualism, clearly marked in his earliest writings and developed throughout his career. Modern life, with its specialised functions and instrumentalism, robs humans of much of their fullness of being; the modern notion of the individual is a ‘degraded particle lacking reality’. Life is reduced to a function: the doctor, priest, teacher, cleaner, or most mutilated of all, the business leader. The incumbent of each of these **roles must absorb the specialised knowledge of their function. Knowledge itself is mutilated in this process, the general or overarching perspective is lost and our relations to other people shrink to the functional level.** We become increasingly contemptuous of those who occupy roles other than our own. in fact, Bataille suggests, it seems as if others, especially those ‘lower’ on the scale of functions, lack being and seem to be mere phantoms. Yet, it is not simply that modernity values instrumental or restricted knowledge over some sense of ‘true’ or authentic knowledge. Knowledge itself is a restriction of experience: it alienates the subject from action and experience, whether this experience is political, erotic, religious or creative, or all of these simultaneously. The modern restriction of being to sets of functions and uses is not at all accidental, nor is it only a by-product of capitalist accumulation: it is part of a fundamental ‘flight’ from being, from the terror of finitude and insufficiency. Indeed, for Bataille, ‘At the basis of human life there exists a principle of insufficiency . . . a limitless insufficiency’ (Bataille, 1985, p. 172). Everything human reveals this insufficiency: the genitals declare mortality and the need to reproduce; the mouth and the anus are evidence of the circulation of energy and the inevitability of waste and discharge; the skin craves the touch of other bodies. Language too testifies that being can never be autonomous, that there is only ‘being-in-relation’ (p. 174). Being is not merely complex, it is labyrinthine – it must wander, and it will lose its way. Bataille’s passionate anti-individualism has led a number of commentators to term Bataille an anti-humanist (Land, 1992; Noys, 2000). This is the case if we take a restricted view of the human, or if we consider the ‘human’ to be a product of restriction and degradation. However, Bataille – particularly in later works, but also in the 1930s – seems to regard the human, at its limits, to be a magnificent, beautiful, even ‘divine’ creature. This was Bataille’s attitude to the Chinese torture victim, to Christ on the cross abandoned both by his followers and by God, and to the emergence of Homo sapiens from animality. Human beings are capable of moving through or beyond the limits imposed by civilisation. This happens through the sacred, through art and **literature**, and through crime and transgression. Human communities and relations can transcend the level of ‘degraded particles’, and this transcendence can endure, at least for a short time: ‘The exchange between two human particles in fact possesses the faculty of surviving momentary separation’ (Bataille, 1985, p. 174). This assertion prefigures Bataille’s development of a general economic thinking on eroticism in the 1940s and 1950s: ‘Men committed to political struggles will never be able to yield to the truth of eroticism’ (1991, p. 191).

**Reject their call for limited debate 😊**

**Pawlett 16** (William Pawlett is a senior lecturer in Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Wolverhampton. His main areas of research are social, cultural and media theory; continental philosophy; and the application of these to the issues of sexuality and consumerism, and to violence, hatred and 'otherness'. He is a member of The Media, Communications and Cultural Studies Association, The British Sociological Association and a global network of scholars contributing to The International Journal of Baudrillard Studies. 2016, “Georges Bataille: The Sacred and Society,” p 89-90, accessed 7/21/2022) ng \*modified for gendered language

Restricted economies and the knowledge they generate are absolutely vital and indispensable for society and for thought. Yet, **restricted economies cannot function without erecting limits** and boundaries, and **there will always be excesses and indeterminacies permeating these boundaries in any particular system**. Indeed, the erection of a boundary or limit itself generates an ‘excess’ beyond that limit. Restricted economies ‘work’ only by drawing, selectively and discretely upon their ‘outside’ – the realm of general economy – and by simultaneously denying that they border an irreducible ‘outside’. The **restricted economies of academic disciplines are generally happy to admit that they have limits,** of a fuzzy sort, **but assume that beyond ‘their’ limit another academic discipline picks up the baton**. For example, sociology may defer to psychology and to biology where the functioning of the individual psyche or of the body are concerned. In concert, academic disciplines purport to offer a seamless and limitless coverage of human experience. Bataille’s contention is that there are inherent and irreducible excesses, **excesses which must be expelled as a precondition for the scientific enterprise to begin.** Science is, for Bataille, restricted by its underlying foundation in utility – ultimately in the profane realm – so that all sciences must accumulate knowledge that is of use to society. The accursed share, that which cannot be reduced to the utilitarian project of scientific thought, is manifest in paradox, anomaly and in the failure to erect meaningful rather than simply useful foundations for knowledge. Further, for Bataille, the subjective or inner experiences of the thinker – ~~his or her~~ [their] experiences of wonder, inspiration, mystery, despair and ecstasy – are experiences that can never be formalised as scientific knowledge, yet they are the source from which all scientific knowledge is generated: the pre- or non-foundations of the scientific enterprise. At the level of thought or enquiry, general economic thinking affirms and confronts the accursed share, where restricted economies deny it or avoid confronting its manifestations.

**We control the root cause of war!**

**Pawlett 16** (William Pawlett is a senior lecturer in Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Wolverhampton. His main areas of research are social, cultural and media theory; continental philosophy; and the application of these to the issues of sexuality and consumerism, and to violence, hatred and 'otherness'. He is a member of The Media, Communications and Cultural Studies Association, The British Sociological Association and a global network of scholars contributing to The International Journal of Baudrillard Studies. 2016, “Georges Bataille: The Sacred and Society,” p 85-87, accessed 7/21/2022) ng

The academic discipline of economics is **deeply inadequate to the task of averting catastrophe** because in it economy is ‘studied as if it were a matter of an isolatable system of operations’ (Bataille, 1988a, 19). General economy insists upon interrelations and interdependence which extend from the microscopic to the cosmological levels. Economics, as restricted economy, studies the exploitation of resources, but it does not enquire into the nature of these resources in any detail: ‘Shouldn’t productive activity as a whole be considered in terms of the modifications it receives from its surroundings . . . isn’t there a need to study the system of human production and consumption within a much larger framework?’ (Bataille, 1988a, p. 20) For Bataille, material resources – wood, coal, atoms, machinery, and human beings too – are caught up in the general economy of excess, expenditure and death. Matter is not simply energetic; it is ‘cursed’ by an explosive excess. It is not simply that all things, objects and materials possess an excess or accursed share. Rather, excess cannot be contained by the definition and circumscription of life into objects, things and materials – these are artificial and idealised constructs. The energy of the accursed share precedes the level of things since the constitution of ‘things’ already presupposes the control, channelling, utilization of energy, and the expulsion of unmanageable excess. 1 Hence from a general economic perspective, **there is no growth, only squandering** – as Bataille asserts in the opening epigraph to this chapter. Production, development and accumulation are merely ‘ideal’ ends imposed by restrictive economics upon general economy. If we restrict our perspective of living beings to separate, particular beings – an individual, a tree, a village – these entities can be understood in terms of necessity and scarcity. Yet the notions of necessity and scarcity are a function of the restricted perspective which denies the dynamism and volatility of matter, its boiling up both within and between beings, in their relations of attraction and repulsion. In the human realm, dynamic relations between beings are generated by non-productive expenditure, through giving, reciprocating or through violence. Further, human beings are ‘privileged’ in their ability to experience glorious or sacrificial expenditure, to partake of the movement of excess in festivity, in sacrificial religion and in eroticism. Human beings then have the ability to choose the modes or forms of sacrificial expenditure ‘that might suit us. . . . For if we do not have the force to destroy the surplus energy ourselves, it cannot be used, and, like an unbroken animal that cannot be trained, it is this energy that destroys us; it is we who pay the price for the inevitable explosion’ (Bataille, 1988a, p. 24). So there is a fundamental ‘political’ question to be considered: how should we expend the excess energies accumulated by modern societies? **What should become of the wealth, power, riches, technologies they develop**? No society, ancient or modern, has found an adequate means to expend without **diverting excess energy and wealth into war**. Today, as Bataille notes, **war – that is the external channelling of violence against designated others – has grown in scale and its destructive capacity threatens to extinguish all human life.** For Bataille, then, it is vital to revolutionise economic, political and ethical thought simultaneously. War can no longer provide a way for societies to expend excess wealth and energy. Where can excesses be channelled? The answer for Bataille is that growth should be immediately ‘subordinated to giving’; commodities should be surrendered without return (Bataille, 1988a, p. 25). Bataille clearly understood **excess American wealth, technology and superpower as a major threat to the human race and the biosphere**, and he gave qualified support to the Marshall Plan, an aid package designed to assist European economies after World War II. This political, or even ‘ethical’, dimension to Bataille’s notion of the accursed share has, surprisingly, not been examined in detail by commentaries on Bataille’s work. Many gloss over it (Land, 1992), or assume it is unworkable or contradictory (Bennington in Bailey-Gill, 1995; Noys, 2000; Gasché, 2012). An exception is Stoekl (1990; 2007) whose application of general economy to contemporary society and ecology is discussed in the concluding chapter.